The second is this actualization, as an external express action and enjoyment.
(7) But since consciousness has found out by experience that the grave of its actual unchangeable Being has no concrete actuality, that the vanished particularity qua vanished is not true particularity, it will give up looking for the unchangeable particular existence as something actual, or will cease trying to hold on to what has thus vanished. The extreme of passive reality is sublated by the active extreme. sophistry and its self-constituted and self-established truth. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, Kojève, A. § 209. its function of perceiving as also its process of securing what is in danger of being lost, viz. (8) The course of this relation we have still to consider. Scepticism is the realisation of that of which Stoicism is merely the notion, and is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is; it is in itself and essentially the negative, and must so exhibit itself. Were it to be in consciousness as it is in itself and for itself, this would certainly have to come about not from the side of consciousness, but from the unchangeable. § 210. The repressed and subordinate type of consciousness, on the other hand, becomes, in the formative activity of work, an object to itself, in the sense that the form, given to the thing when shaped and moulded, is his object; he sees in the master, at the same time, self-existence as a real mode of consciousness. In point of fact, through the unchangeable assuming a definite form, the beyond, as a moment, has not only remained, but really is more securely established. In Scepticism, it realizes itself, negates the other side of determinate existence, but, in so doing, really doubles itself, and is itself now a duality. In the third case, it discovers itself to be this particular fact in the unchangeable. From both sides, therefore, there is detached merely a superficial element to constitute their opposition; they are only opposed at the surface, and the play of opposition, the one to the other, takes place there. § 223. The determinations in abstract thought, however, are scientific notions, into which formal contentless thought expands itself, attaching the notion, as a matter of fact in merely an external fashion, to the existence independent of it, and holding as valid only determinate notions, albeit they are still pure abstractions. Which you don’t. This new attitude consequently is one which is aware of being the double consciousness of itself as self-liberating, unalterable, self-identical, and as utterly self-confounding, self-perverting; and this new attitude is the consciousness of this contradiction within itself.
The first unchangeable is taken to be merely the alien, external Being, (2) which passes sentence on particular existence; since the second unchangeable is a form or mode of particularity like itself (3), it, i.e. 0000006920 00000 n
But therein it is also in itself; this aspect belongs to the unchangeable beyond. This aspect consists in faculties and powers: an external gift, which the unchangeable here hands over for the consciousness to make use of.
If sameness is shown to it, it points out unlikeness, non-identity; and when the latter, which it has expressly mentioned the moment before, is held up to it, it passes on to indicate sameness and identity. It lets the unessential content in its thought vanish; but in that very act it is the consciousness of something unessential. Stoicism—Skepticism—The Unhappy Consciousness G.W.F.
0000002461 00000 n Active force appears as the power wherein actual reality is dissolved. This is the reason why it appears peculiar that Phyrronism is blamed for leading to an incapacity of action (apraxia). Rather it is immediately both itself; and the relation of both assumes for it the form of a relation of essence to the non-essential, so that this latter has to be cancelled; but since both are to it equally essential and are contradictory, it is only the conflicting contradictory process in which opposite does not come to rest in its own opposite, but produces itself therein afresh merely as an opposite. To begin with, as regards the contrasted relation of consciousness, in which its reality is taken to be immediately naught, its actual performance thus becomes a doing of nothing at all; its enjoyment becomes a feeling of its own unhappiness. 0000122603 00000 n 0000012655 00000 n The reflexion is thus duplicated. For that movement is carried on in these moments: an unchangeable now opposed to the particular in general, then, being itself particular, opposed to the other particular, and finally at one with it. It has gone beyond both of these; it brings and keeps together pure thought and particular existence, but has not yet risen to that level of thinking where the particularity of consciousness is harmoniously reconciled with pure though itself.
(7) But since consciousness has found out by experience that the grave of its actual unchangeable Being has no concrete actuality, that the vanished particularity qua vanished is not true particularity, it will give up looking for the unchangeable particular existence as something actual, or will cease trying to hold on to what has thus vanished. The extreme of passive reality is sublated by the active extreme. sophistry and its self-constituted and self-established truth. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, Kojève, A. § 209. its function of perceiving as also its process of securing what is in danger of being lost, viz. (8) The course of this relation we have still to consider. Scepticism is the realisation of that of which Stoicism is merely the notion, and is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is; it is in itself and essentially the negative, and must so exhibit itself. Were it to be in consciousness as it is in itself and for itself, this would certainly have to come about not from the side of consciousness, but from the unchangeable. § 210. The repressed and subordinate type of consciousness, on the other hand, becomes, in the formative activity of work, an object to itself, in the sense that the form, given to the thing when shaped and moulded, is his object; he sees in the master, at the same time, self-existence as a real mode of consciousness. In point of fact, through the unchangeable assuming a definite form, the beyond, as a moment, has not only remained, but really is more securely established. In Scepticism, it realizes itself, negates the other side of determinate existence, but, in so doing, really doubles itself, and is itself now a duality. In the third case, it discovers itself to be this particular fact in the unchangeable. From both sides, therefore, there is detached merely a superficial element to constitute their opposition; they are only opposed at the surface, and the play of opposition, the one to the other, takes place there. § 223. The determinations in abstract thought, however, are scientific notions, into which formal contentless thought expands itself, attaching the notion, as a matter of fact in merely an external fashion, to the existence independent of it, and holding as valid only determinate notions, albeit they are still pure abstractions. Which you don’t. This new attitude consequently is one which is aware of being the double consciousness of itself as self-liberating, unalterable, self-identical, and as utterly self-confounding, self-perverting; and this new attitude is the consciousness of this contradiction within itself.
The first unchangeable is taken to be merely the alien, external Being, (2) which passes sentence on particular existence; since the second unchangeable is a form or mode of particularity like itself (3), it, i.e. 0000006920 00000 n
But therein it is also in itself; this aspect belongs to the unchangeable beyond. This aspect consists in faculties and powers: an external gift, which the unchangeable here hands over for the consciousness to make use of.
If sameness is shown to it, it points out unlikeness, non-identity; and when the latter, which it has expressly mentioned the moment before, is held up to it, it passes on to indicate sameness and identity. It lets the unessential content in its thought vanish; but in that very act it is the consciousness of something unessential. Stoicism—Skepticism—The Unhappy Consciousness G.W.F.
0000002461 00000 n Active force appears as the power wherein actual reality is dissolved. This is the reason why it appears peculiar that Phyrronism is blamed for leading to an incapacity of action (apraxia). Rather it is immediately both itself; and the relation of both assumes for it the form of a relation of essence to the non-essential, so that this latter has to be cancelled; but since both are to it equally essential and are contradictory, it is only the conflicting contradictory process in which opposite does not come to rest in its own opposite, but produces itself therein afresh merely as an opposite. To begin with, as regards the contrasted relation of consciousness, in which its reality is taken to be immediately naught, its actual performance thus becomes a doing of nothing at all; its enjoyment becomes a feeling of its own unhappiness. 0000122603 00000 n 0000012655 00000 n The reflexion is thus duplicated. For that movement is carried on in these moments: an unchangeable now opposed to the particular in general, then, being itself particular, opposed to the other particular, and finally at one with it. It has gone beyond both of these; it brings and keeps together pure thought and particular existence, but has not yet risen to that level of thinking where the particularity of consciousness is harmoniously reconciled with pure though itself.